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Abstract In Western Europe, cities grew fast between 1000 and 1300. This article
looks at how the migrants moving to these emerging cities melded into communities
and defended their collective rights in violent and hostile environments. It discusses
a number of trust networks that were developed to meet the successive collective
needs of particular social layers in rapidly changing urban societies. When a trust
network became well-established and too large to allow face-to-face relations among
all its members, institutions were created that operated under different rules.
In his last manuscript, Charles Tilly developed the concept of trust networks as
organizations mediating in the long-term transformation from urban to state
domination in world history. Trust networks can be defined as specific patterns of
human relationships in which shared interests, values and norms facilitate
communication and collaboration and thus reduce transaction costs. Trust networks
are based on commitment, coordination, and recognition which often, but not
always, are mutual. Membership of a trust network entails a “relation in which at
least one party places a valued enterprise at risk in the hands of the other.… Prudent
members of trust networks have generally tried to insulate them from predation or
incorporation by cities and states (Tilly 2010).” In this article, I show how trust
networks emerged and became established in the cities of Europe between about
1000 and 1600 CE. In my view, community building in the first stage of urban
growth rested essentially on personal ties, formalized by oaths of loyalty. These were
at the origin of the sense of belonging expressed in the first communes, the
groupings that fought for their independence vis-à-vis the established feudal and
ecclesiastical powers. As the European cities grew, these networks needed to
organize themselves as public institutions, which allegedly changed their character
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fundamentally. This transition process from personal ties to institution building
deserves special attention as this was the time when new unprecedented forms of
social organization came into being. They determined the rise of urban ways of life,
capitalism, and Western concepts of human rights.
Instead of taking a traditional approach that focuses on concepts such as juridical
categories, social class, and market structures, I put forward the idea that trust
networks can provide a better understanding of the emergence and further
development of these European urban communities. At the same time, I examine
where the limits lie of the efficiency of personal trust networks, with regard to the
scale of the organizations they were supposed to run, and the internal conflicts of
interest that arose within the cities, between cities, and between cities and states. The
most general and effective form of a trust network is kinship which typically bound
members of aristocracies, and which surely also played a major role in the formation
of urban elites. Property rights on ground parcels were at the basis of their
domination, and these rights were transferred through inheritance and marriage.
Within the Catholic Church, networks based on belief, lifestyle, and education
evidently functioned in a relatively wealthy elite on a very wide geographical scale.
These were partly urban (the bishops’ seats, the parishes and, from the thirteenth
century onwards, the mendicants’ orders) and largely rural in the traditional monastic
orders. Trust networks were also present within the aristocracies in the form of
kinship groups sharing a common chivalric life style and by feudal bonds organizing
groups of loyal armed followers. I argue that the emerging cities of Europe were
home to several new forms of trust networks that strengthened the social cohesion
within as well as between these urban communities. However, when in the thirteenth
century the cities reached their medieval peak in population (Clark 2009), their sheer
size and internal conflicts required institutions in which trust was no longer the self-
evident basis of operation.
Six types
I now discuss the successive types of trust networks that came into being within and
between urban communities. In the current literature, they have been described as
distinct features having various names in different cities, without the link being made
with regard to the similarity of their internal structure and their functional basis. A
first type that comes to mind is that of traveling merchants seeking protection within
horizontal associations such as guilds and hanses. From the eleventh century
onwards, when the cities were in their phase of rapid growth, these associations
offered many opportunities to people from all sorts of social backgrounds. Inclusion
and social mobility were vital factors that promoted urban expansion. The
administration of the cities was firmly in the hands of the local merchants’ family
clans and associations, which I will consider as the second type of trust network. A
third type emerged when artisans began to organize themselves in confraternities and
craft guilds and challenged the merchants’ monopoly on economic, juridical and
political power. In Italy, extensive trust networks of a fourth type were created as
capital was accumulated on an ever growing scale in joint-stock companies that had
agents in nodal cities from Palestine, Egypt and the Black Sea to the North Sea. In
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regions where the landed aristocracy held residence in the cities, they introduced
their organizational pattern based on kinship and clienteles, which in the urban
setting created a fifth type of trust network, that of the parties or even gangs
struggling for local power. At the same time, a different process led to the formation
of consolidated states. Their traditional elites belonging to the Church and the
aristocracy merged into the new officialdom. In their midst emerged a sixth type of
trust network that overarched the older ones and grew steadily. By this time, the
older networks were already largely exclusive. All these networks were primarily
located in cities, but the networks of servants of the state no longer primarily served
the urban interests, although they may have mediated between cities and states. I
focus on the most urbanized regions in Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth
century. For the first sections of my article, most data will be produced for the
Southern Low Countries, one of the earliest and most urbanized regions, for which
the available information is not easily accessible.
I clarify the ways in which the incipient urban communities succeeded in creating,
almost from scratch, entirely new forms of social attitudes and relations. I think this
issue has not been adequately dealt with even though its relevance is clearly
apparent. Indeed, it is too easily taken for granted that emerging urban communities
displayed a spirit of solidarity and held common values from the very outset. Not
only does this seem highly unlikely in view of the rapid migrations that occurred and
the frequent use of violence reported in the early cities. We have a number of sources
that clearly demonstrate awareness of the need to impose new norms. These
generally aimed at the internal pacification of the urban community and the external
protection of its members. The norms changed incrementally as they gradually
emerged over the centuries under the influence of measures taken to address urgent
practical problems. There were no historical models or theoretical blueprints to fall
back on in dealing with the challenges these growing urban communities had to face
in Western Europe from the eleventh century onwards. Therefore, the outcomes of
this incremental process varied greatly from one place to another. This was largely a
new phenomenon in world history. The levels of urban autonomy and self-
governance, combined with the protection of the rights of individual citizens and
their property, are generally seen as the key elements that drove economic growth
and particularly the development of commercial capitalism (Mielants 2007). This is
what distinguishes the urbanization process in medieval Europe from all its
precedents and sets it apart from the earlier developing cities of Asia.
The search for liberty
What did it mean in the first stage of urban growth for a landless laborer or serf to
run away, try to escape the limitations to his personal freedom, but at the same time
giving up the protection his lord had provided him within a domain structure? The
earliest urban charters of liberty dealt with this matter. The oldest in the Low
Countries is that of the town of Huy on the river Meuse, dating from 1066. Several
articles deal with the position of serfs who fled their domain to go and work in the
towns. If the lord of the domain came to claim his return and was able to prove his
case, he could require the serf to continue performing his traditional duties for him
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(Joris 1959). This situation may have prevailed for some time in predominantly rural
areas, but larger urban communities soon bought off the rights by which the
landlords still limited their personal freedom. This was already the case before 1100
in places where the local lord was a bishop or an abbot, as in Cambrai, Utrecht,
Tournai, and Nivelles. In the 1110s, the larger cities of Arras (1111), Ypres and
Douai followed suit. In 1067, the count of Flanders, wanted to attract inhabitants to
his newly-founded town of Geraardsbergen, strategically located on a hill on the
border with the duchy of Brabant. He did this by promising independent jurisdiction
by the aldermen. Freedom from judicial interference by the landlords meant a solid
guarantee for the inhabitants of new towns, which would probably have been
preferable to protection from their landlord. A further step was to ensure the
legislative authority of these aldermen. The oldest documented right to create new
urban law was granted to the small town of Aire-sur-la-Lys between 1093 and 1111.
In 1127, the larger cities of Bruges and Saint Omer made clear that their support for
a candidate-count would depend on his recognizing their right to modify their local
customary laws in accordance to their needs. However, all this did not yet imply that
all inhabitants of these cities would be considered as free men. King of France Louis
VI (1098–1137) first orally granted personal freedom to citizens if they had been
residents for at least one year and one day, a right that was acknowledged by his
successors. In England, the oldest mention of these rights was in 1155, and in the
Low Countries it first appeared in the foundation charter of the harbor town
Nieuwpoort, dating from 1163. As in Geraardsbergen, a century earlier, rulers
granted new privileges in the hope to see their own foundations grow (van
Caenegem 1994; IDEM 1968).
Merchants’ associations
The unity of jurisdiction, legislation, and later also of equality in personal freedom,must
have created some degree of homogeneity, social cohesion, and law and order within the
cities, where masses of disgruntled migrants came together. Moreover, the urban
liberties created relatively small isolated areas within an overall rural world still firmly
dominated by feudal powers. Looking at the content of the oldest urban charters, the
most general concern was that of the preservation of peace by sound jurisdiction, if
necessary against everybody, including the count himself. As such, the citizens saw
themselves as being united in defense against a world where violence was omnipresent.
In the charter for Saint Omer, dated 1127, the newly-inaugurated count even recognized
the sworn commune of the city, which had formed the core of the solidarity movement
against all kinds of feudal restrictions. Citizenship was thus acquired on the condition
of swearing an oath of loyalty to the community, which implied the observance of
rules. The aldermen strove to limit violence within the city walls by ruling against
fighting and feuding and by imposing restrictions on foreigners. They had to leave
their arms at the city gate. Criminal justice grew increasingly detailed and aimed at
controlling private violence through the prescription of peace-making procedures.
Breaking a sworn peace was heavily fined.
Before cities had written charters, the core of cohesion among citizens was laid
down at the level of the social elite, which consisted mainly of merchants. Their
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wheeling-and-dealing required various forms of organization to protect their vital
interests in a world that was still dominated by feudal powers. The oldest documents
informing us about the self-organization of traveling merchants designate their
associations using terms such as amicitia, friendship, guild and hanse. The
merchants of Valenciennes on the river Scheldt established a caritet: a charity or
confraternity. In their statute, dated between 1050 and 1070, love of God, the
observance of common religious services and solidarity among all brethren formed
the basis of this group. The confraternity arranged funeral and memorial ceremonies
for deceased brethren. The membership fee was used in charitable works for mutual
support as well as for other inhabitants. Banquets and drinking parties, libationes
were held to foster a sense of community. All these niceties were inspired by the
material need for this solidarity group: members had to travel safely to markets and
being armed and in a group was an effective way to protect and support each other.
Conflicts between members had to be mediated by the other members.
Similar statutes have been preserved of the merchants’ guilds of Saint Omer and
Arras, both situated in the county of Flanders, dating from 1072/1083. They are
more explicit about the settlement of conflicts arising after too much drink. The
deans of these associations not only mediated for guaranty for the members; they
were even granted jurisdiction over the citizens. The gradual transition from private
associations into public authorities is apparent in the charter for the amicitia of Aire-
sur-la-Lys, dated before 1111. Twelve judges from their midst ruled over the town,
applying laws they were entitled to amend themselves. The 1127 charter for the city
of Saint Omer extended certain privileges exclusively to the members of the
merchants’ guild. It granted its members the freedom not to pay tolls and the revenue
from the local mint was assigned to the maintenance of the guild (Blockmans 1999).
One can thus conclude that in the eleventh century civilized behavior needed to
be rigorously imposed upon the merchants’ elite through compulsory adherence to
the association. That performed charitable works, religious ceremonies, convivial
meetings, and the peaceful mediation of conflicts between members. This
socialization process formed the condition required for the solidarity needed to
protect trade beyond the city walls. In the course of the twelfth century, the
merchants took the lead in forming what would become the public authority in the
cities, and restricted certain material and judicial privileges to themselves. Their
associations clearly functioned as trust networks, essential for the organization of the
urban communities and for the trade between cities.
Merchants’ guilds as urban governments
Which new juridical regulations needed to be developed to enable the economic
activities which would bring about the ongoing and self-sustained urban growth?
Apart from a concern about peace and justice, urban charters abounded with
advantages granted to the citizens of a particular city, such as freedom from paying
tolls or taxes. Litigation concerning commercial affairs was only possible before the
local aldermen, who were the experienced specialists in these matters. Their
jurisdiction needed to be fast and efficient. Therefore, they introduced evidence on
the only basis of sound testimony by trustworthy fellow citizens. In the 1127 charter
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for Saint Omer, we come across the concept of trust among some citizens who
needed a quick settlement of disputes in relation to their trade, especially in cases of
debt. The sworn commune thus formed the basis of a trust network, whose members
were exclusively eligible for public office in the city. Their relations facilitated
commercial transactions, and gradually their network extended to the government of
the cities. The sometimes ferocious resistance by the feudal powers against the
emerging communes helped to foster their cohesion, based on oaths of allegiance and
reliability; the external threats strengthened the internal solidarity.
As soon as urban magistrates had seen their autonomy and legislative powers
recognized, including their exclusive judicial competence over their burgesses, they
firmly strove at supporting the economic interests of their own core group, that of
the associated merchants and entrepreneurs. Personal freedom, the guarantee of
property rights and secular jurisdiction by one’s peers were at the basis of this
endeavor. A case in point is the abolishing of trials by ordeal, as first documented in
the charter for Ypres in 1116. Further steps were the restrictions on the use of private
violence and the protection of private property against confiscation. Mediation by
experts came to replace the reliance on irrational factors for the settlement of
conflicts. Urban charters steadily contain exemptions, extended to entire territories,
from tributes, tolls, and other taxes charged on trade. Standardization of the quality
of products, measures, weights, and currency was equally a major concern.
The physical protection of the traveling merchants and their goods that had first
been organized by their private associations was now taken over by the cities’ public
authorities. They concluded treaties with foreign rulers in order to ensure the security
and trading facilities of their own citizens abroad. This implied that urban
magistrates could also undertake diplomatic action in cases of a violation of their
citizens’ rights. If disputes could not be settled by negotiation, urban magistrates
would decree retaliations against the subjects of the foreign authority, as a way to
pressure them into being more lenient. The arrest of merchants and confiscation of
their goods was ordered by municipalities. However, such measures often triggered
an escalation of the conflict, which then lasted longer and caused further damage to
economic relations. Because of this, individual cities sought alliances with cities that
had similar trading interests in order to extend the level of protection and increase
their capacity to counteract. Originally, these urban leagues were private organ-
izations set up by the merchants themselves. Depending on the flow and extent of
urban development, public authorities took over this role and the principalities were
to become the framework of their organization. The latter happened in the county of
Flanders in the course of the thirteenth century (Blockmans 1994). The most
prominent late example of such a transition is the German Hanse, which emerged as
an association of merchants and did not become a league of cities until 1356 and
continued to operate beyond the territories of the relatively weakly developed
monarchic states in Northern Germany.
Even if the merchants’ interest groups managed to organize themselves at a supra-
local level, the diversity and fragmentation of urban judicial spheres severely limited
their capacity to protect their citizens beyond their own walls. The most
extraordinary system of regional protection that developed in Northern France and
Flanders in the twelfth century was that of the fairs. These were initiated by local
authorities trying to attract merchants from abroad by offering them protection, not
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only in the city where the fair was held, but also along their journey. It was the
coordination of a calendar of fairs throughout the year in a region protected by a
single powerful ruler that created huge economies of scale. Fairs held on set dates
improved the capacity to plan transactions in the long term, increased the intensity
and speed of information exchange, and thus considerably reduced transaction costs.
The counts of Champagne were the undisputed champions of this new regional
system of fairs that linked Northern and Central Italy through Northern France,
including Paris, with the cycles of fairs held in Flanders and Southern England (Pohl
and Pohle 1991). The Lille fair is the oldest documented event in Flanders,
mentioned in 1127. Yearly cycles developed in the course of that century. It became
possible for merchants to plan journeys traveling from one fair to another, and from
one region to the next. Increased revenue from local duties, dispute settlement and
coinage were profitable for the authorities. The merchants appreciated the
stabilization of the conditions protecting and facilitating their trade, which thus
became more calculable.
These regular and predictable meetings brought about the development of
international trust networks. About 8,000 contracts drawn up at the fairs of Ypres
during the second half of the thirteenth century have been preserved and reveal
regular transactions between merchants from Italy, England, Flanders, and France.
Flemish merchants made agreements in Ypres to finance future fairs in the
Champagne cycle with partners from England and Italy. This trust network now
extended to the whole of Western Europe, and commercial credit became the
foundation of all transactions from Italy to England via Champagne and Flanders
(Blockmans 2001). Trust flourished under the protection of the local and regional
judicial authorities, but probably even more through the sanction of exclusion that
could be imposed by the highly profitable trust networks.
Craft guilds
From the mid-thirteenth century onwards, artisans in the most industrialized regions
in Italy and the Low Countries started to organize themselves, following the model
of the merchants’ guilds. Cities then reached the peak in their demographic growth
and became exclusive. Their confraternities similarly were embedded in religious
ceremonies such as funeral and memorial services, the cult of a patron saint via an
altar or a chapel and processions. Charitable care for the sick and elderly members as
well as for their widows and orphans was equally imitated from the merchants’
guilds, as were the dinners in common. As the large industrial towns like Arras,
Douai, Ypres, Ghent, and Bruges grew increasingly divided by class conflicts, the
merchants and entrepreneurs who monopolized the city administration strongly
opposed the evolution of artisans’ confraternities into professional corporations
supporting the social and economic interests of a particular sector (Najemy 2006;
Wyffels 1951; Keene 2006; Rosser 2006).
The class conflicts, just as well as frictions with other, mutually-exclusive
professional groups’ common interests and rituals, living in the same neighborhood,
incorporated in the urban militias as a distinct entity behind their own standard: all
these factors fostered the sense of community within the craft guilds. In the cases
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where they acquired a share in the city’s government, such as in Flanders after 1302,
the relations between the members shifted from mutual trust and charitable support
vis-à-vis common enemies towards the sheer defense of material interests. Some of
the largest corporations in the textile sector counted several thousands members,
which is a size to which the concept of trust network can no longer be applied
(Prevenier 1983). Entrepreneurial patterns based on putting-out and subcontracting
undermined the alleged equality and brotherhood among the guild members.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested for Paris and other European cities from the
late Middle Ages to the end of the Ancient Régime that “most trades were organized
around complex networks of informally constituted co-operative arrangements
involving varying combinations of partnership, patronage, and clientage (Sonenscher
1989, As cited by Lis and Soly 2008).” Evidently, the role of the corporative
movement in the formation of the urban communities cannot be neglected. The
growing complexity of the urban societies was stabilized by its corporative structure;
each of its components found its origins in a trust network.
Merchants’ companies
The system of international fairs described above was one of the many scenes on
which the fourth type of trust network operated, namely the companies of merchants
from cities in Northern and Central Italy. In the mid-thirteenth century, they
appeared in contracts under the name of a particular family based in a particular city,
with their partners. These joint-stock companies had grown from a family
association into a larger organization attracting other investors and agents. They
sent their junior partners as their representatives in their various locations as well as
to the major fairs. Given the large scale of the operations and the huge investments
and risk involved, trust must have been the basis of these commercial companies,
which extended their network from one Italian city to many others in the Peninsula,
around the Mediterranean and in Western Europe. Family ties stood at the origin of
these trust networks while other shareholders and agents were bound by the high
professional standards of these companies. New accounting techniques such as
double booking-keeping guaranteed permanent control of the transactions. Agents
abroad had to keep close contact with the headquarters through intensive
correspondence of letters and bills of exchange (Hunt 1994; Hunt and Murray
1999).
Party clans
Not all cities and towns were dominated by merchants, nor did craft guilds generally
acquire political participation. These relations obviously depended on the local
development as an export-oriented economy of a substantial size. And even in
Northern and Central Italy, where this was clearly the case, the balance of power
between the merchant class and the aristocracy living in the cities as well as in the
countryside was more complicated. Venice may have been the clearest case of a
merchants’ republic, but in most land-locked cities the rivalry between popes and
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emperors, from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, dragged the aristocracy into the
formation of antagonistic clans (Crouzet-Pavan 1997; IDEM 2001, 2002, 2009).
Their conflicts continued to dominate the political culture even beyond the original
controversies, as the parties absorbed and re-oriented all controversies in the urban
community towards their own goals. Mutual exclusion from power and banishment
of the losers from the city perpetuated the tensions and exported them into the
countryside. This pattern has been described for the Italian and Catalan cities as well
as for the Northern Low Countries (Heers 1977; Najemy 2006; Curull 2009). At the
origin, parties and clans were based on the loyalty of family bonds. Their appearance
seems bound to the presence of the aristocracy in the cities, which introduced there
the type of power struggles and the organization based on clienteles. Their extension
brought the inclusion of friends and clients whose social status may have been much
lower. Parties were rather vertical organizations, in which differences of social class
were superseded by the sheer strife for power.
Officialdom
The sixth and last type of network, that of state officials, mainly recruited citizens as
experts in the centralization of statecraft. An early case is that of Castile where urban
oligarchies were dominated by the caballeros, the lower nobility living in the cities
and living off their landed properties acquired during the Reconquista. Their military
service for the king and counts yielded them spoils of war. From the twelfth century
onwards, they represented the cities in the Cortes. By this accumulation of power,
they could keep down the political weight of merchants and craftsmen (Asenjo-
Gonzalez). While state personnel had traditionally been recruited from the clergy and
the aristocracy, since the fourteenth century, the growth of central institutions
attracted university-trained lawyers and financial specialists from urban origins.
Socialization with the prevailing aristocratic values implied that burgesses devoted
their skills less in favor of urban development than for the strengthening of state
domination over the cities. On the other hand, states increasingly used their
supremacy to appoint their officials in the cities and gradually extend their powers
(Reinhard 1996; Asenjo-Gonzalez 2009, 35–45).
This was the period, after 1300, which the late Larry Epstein characterized by the
cities’ “institutional inefficiency” as a consequence of the “jurisdictional fragmen-
tation” and the “parcellization of sovereignty (Epstein 2000).” In my opinion, his
interpretation of “Freedom and Growth” is only correct from the viewpoint of public
institutions. On that level, monarchic states indeed proved often more efficient than
regional states under urban hegemony. They balanced countervailing powers within
larger territories. However, one should not overlook the lasting cases of Venice, the
United Provinces, and the Swiss Confederation. Nor should the efficiency of
monarchies be overestimated. Until the end of the sixteenth century, the complex
balances between cities and states left room for mutual bargaining and support, as
well as for hostilities and increasing state domination. Urban elites, seated in the
nodes controlling territories, often negotiated private privileges including control of
the countryside in exchange for financial, military, and strategic services (Isaacs and
Prak 1996; Hart 1994; Blickle 1997; Blockmans et al. 2009).
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Functions and limits
In the preceding pages, a number of trust networks have been observed and
classified into six types. Each of them fulfilled particular functions in a specific
period of the development of cities. Proximity facilitating frequent personal contacts,
situations of open competition or even of external threats over and again were the
most favorable contexts to see trust networks actively engaged in social change.
Some of them lost their functions over the course of time. Merchants’ associations
were successfully able at some point in time to civilize their companions, to organize
their collective self-defense, to have them protected during their journeys as well as
privileged by consolidated states, and to negotiate with foreign authorities on trade
regulations. From the fifteenth century onwards, the protection, jurisdiction, and
negotiation about trade relations increasingly became concerns the territorial states
claimed to fulfill. However, private corporations of merchants continued to take care
of these primordial issues in regions where states were weak as well as on the
maritime routes beyond the jurisdiction of any state. One may think of the chartered
companies that organized most of the colonial trade until the early nineteenth
century. Internal pacification and the generalization of the rule of law by the
sixteenth century led in most European cities to the extinction of armed conflicts
between private gangs or parties who took the law in their own hands. However,
even nowadays the weakness of state power in Southern Italy and Eastern Europe
still gives this phenomenon contemporary relevance.
In most cases, the local merchants’ guilds had to give up ruling their city exclusively.
The arbitrariness and abuse of power by their monopolistic governments from the
thirteenth century onwards led to revolts that triggered the intervention of the territorial
rulers who imposed a division of power among contending factions (Blockmans 1989;
Boone and Prak 1995; Boone 2007; Curull 2009, 10). From a structural viewpoint,
one may also argue that cities had simply grown too large and had internally become
too diversified to be ruled by a merchants’ trust network. Institutions and professionals
took over and created a more formalistic type of government in which countervailing
powers were kept in balance. Cities may still have been ruled by oligarchies, but these
could no longer function on the basis of trust networks alone. A similar reasoning
applies to the craft guilds that, by growing and getting involved in the participation of
some forms of local government, became formal institutions applying rules rather than
relying on the mutual trust between their prominent members. Roberto Michels’s iron
law of oligarchization fully applied to guilds and crafts. The same can be said about
the trust networks that in the early stage of state building, could act as mediators
between cities and states. However, the growth and professionalization of state
bureaucracies increasingly limited their impact. State officers gradually became
recruited more on the basis of merit than that of friendship and trust. This mechanism
equally applied to trading companies: the larger they became, the more they had to
develop as formal institutions applying rules.
Obviously, these tendencies are far from absolute: even in the present day, trust
networks play a role, also in large organizations. What we could observe was that
various types of trust networks were essential in transitional stages, before the
formation of new institutions: they fostered the sense of community among
particular groups in the emerging cities; they helped to create systems to protect
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and regulate regional and international trade; they were at the basis of systems of
social security and the defense of workers’ rights; they were at the core of joint stock
companies operating on an intercontinental scale; they were intermediaries between
aristocratic, municipal, and state power systems. In all these situations, trust networks
were needed to create new activities and social relations. Once these communities
became successful and grew, they required institutionalization and reduced the trust
networks to possibly influential but no longer determining organizations, resisting
“incorporation by cities and states,” as noted by Charles Tilly.
For my purpose here, however, it is essential that in the very long term the fourth
trust network type—the international trading and entrepreneurial companies—
continue to prove the extraordinary adaptive capacity of capitalism. These networks
grew to a scale that outclassed that of most modern states—even if at this very
moment states come to rescue some of them. But this exactly supports my point: the
originality of the medieval commercial trust networks continued to create freedom as
well as growth, at least for their privileged members.
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